Amsterdams airport, Schipol, is under water. Aircrafts cant move
in or out. Chaos has ensued.
So begins the 1983 Alistair MacLean adventure
novel, Floodgate. In it, a group of extremists terrorize Holland, threatening
to blow up the countrys infamous dikes and create deadly flooding.
Though far-flung at first glance, such terrorist scenarios have become part
of the day-to-day thinking process for state and federal agencies seeking to
protect American infrastructure from attack. In deciding what information could
pose harm to the country if made public, they must think like terrorists, says
Maeve Boland, a graduate student at the Colorado School of Mines.
A geologist, Boland has been studying U.S. policy on geospatial data for her
doctoral thesis in public policy. Shes noticed a trend of geospatial data
disappearing from digital maps and databases: oil and gas pipelines, power stations,
logging roads, reservoirs and dams, to name a few. Although disappointing, Boland
says, the trend is not surprising.
Ever since White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card last year issued a memo to
the heads of all federal departments and agencies, ordering them to protect
sensitive but unclassified information from inappropriate disclosure,
more and more agencies are removing such sensitive data from the public forum
worried that the Floodgate story may be closer to reality than not.
But just what data constitute sensitive but unclassified, also called
sensitive homeland security information, has yet to be determined.
Traditionally, data have been either classified or unclassified. At a House
Science Committee hearing last October, John Marburger, the presidents
science advisor, said: The designation Sensitive Homeland Security Information
(SHSI) does not refer to some new category of information; rather it is the
type of information that the government holds today that is not routinely released
to the general public, such as law enforcement data and critical computer security
threats or vulnerabilities. The vast majority of government information is and
will remain publicly accessible.
In February, a group of more than 30 authors and journals, including Science
and Nature, announced that they would begin screening papers for data that might
pose a security threat, particularly for developing biological weapons; if the
risk of publication outweighs the benefits, the paper will not go to print.
Geospatial data, while not completely insulated, are often less sensitive than
biological information, but are still a concern among federal agencies. Unclassified
geospatial information is by far the most useful for everyone, but who that
everyone actually is remains an issue in a time of concern for homeland
security, says Martin Eckes, senior policy advisor for mapping at the
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS).
Case in point is the well-publicized removal of USGS water CDs from the public
domain. Water suppliers requested that USGS not publicly distribute the CDs,
which contained their information about drinking water intakes. USGS decided
to ask libraries that already had the CDs to destroy them until they could release
the information without worry. At the time we put it together, we were
assuming a public that was concerned about water quality to protect its water
quality, says Katherine Lins, acting chief of the Office of Information
for USGS water resources. And suddenly we realized when we got this request
in from the water suppliers community that we were handing information
up that might put their facilities at risk,
That was in October of 2001. Since then, USGS, like other federal agencies,
has actively discussed how to handle potentially sensitive data without restricting
them from public access, Lins says. Rather than removing the data, USGS decided
to carefully select language that would not reveal sensitive information
for example, listing a well but not specifying it as a drinking water intake.
But many agencies have opted to remove sensitive data outright from their sites.
In October 2001, the Department of Transportation removed pipeline mapping information
from its Web site. In April 2002, the Environmental Protection Agency restricted
direct access to some of its data-
bases on water, air, toxics and radiation to federal agencies and contractors
only. The Department of Energy (DOE) has removed a range of information over
the past two years, from energy market maps and energy infrastructure maps to
information on liquefied gas fuel dangers. The list goes on.
Boland says that much of this response comes from fear. Somebody has to
actually put their name to saying whether its in the greater publics
interest to have the information out there with the slim chance that someone
might use it against us, or if it is better to be ultra cautious and take everything
off access; nobody wants their signature on something that might backfire.
As more maps go digital, agencies can more easily choose to remove sensitive
geospatial data, particularly on layered GIS maps, Boland adds. The average
USGS map is over 20 years old, so any information on those paper maps is going
to stay there a while. But with digital information, you can just click and
remove a layer.
Donna Anderson, an assistant research professor of geology at the Colorado School
of Mines, is working on a DOE research proposal to geologically characterize
potential places to sequester carbon dioxide. She wanted to map the radii around
power plants, which are large sources of carbon dioxide emissions, as possible
sites for sequestration.
In my searches, I was looking for power plant locations as well as pipeline
locations, and I kept running into federal government Web sites where the information
was no longer accessible, Anderson says. Some of the data had been removed
as recently as January, she says. The interesting corollary to that is
that in the last couple of weeks, I have gotten e-mail advertisements from private
companies offering data on CD and hard copy for the sum of $299.
Anderson obtained the information she needed the old-fashioned way, before the
boom of free data on the Internet. She pieced together topographic maps and
paper publications that the State of Utah had put out years ago. And I
digitized my own pipelines, she says.
Although her experience posed a mere inconvenience, Anderson has concerns about
the big picture. Its a general question in my mind whether, say,
the USGS topographic map information will remain on the Web for free forever.
If the data become unavailable due to tighter security, she fears a commercialization
of information similar to what happened with Landsat data in the 1980s, when
the satellite imagery became privatized, dramatically raising the cost of research.
Geospatial data could become more classified as the country redefines national
security, Boland says. USGS has traditionally been the civilian mapping agency
for the domestic United States. The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA)
is the militarys mapping branch and part of the intelligence community,
with a stated mission to provide timely, relevant and accurate geospatial
intelligence in support of national security.
Really until September 11, everyone assumed national security meant overseas,
Boland says. The definition of national security has been completely turned
around and now it means homeland security as well as international security,
so NIMA sees itself as having an important role in mapping the United States
as well as overseas. And that could spell a culture shift from the public
domain access of USGS to the classified nature of NIMA.
Eckes of USGS says that NIMAs new emphasis on geospatial intelligence
for homeland security has precipitated some strong intrusions on traditional
USGS mission areas. For the past year, he says, the two agencies have been working
together under a memo of understanding that outlines a blueprint for partnership.
Anita Cohen, director for the Office of Americas at NIMA says that layers in
the USGS National Map (proposed in 2001 and still in its infancy) provide a
foundation for NIMA mapping. On top of that, we provide denser data required
for the homeland security mission, she says.
Much of that data, however, is commercially available for a fee, posing a greater
risk to information availability than potential classification, Cohen says.
We buy it and of course cant put it in the public domain, but still
use it for the purpose of homeland security. NIMAs priority, she
says, is to provide unclassified data for homeland security. Critical
to the national security mission is the ability to widely share data, for example
with state and local as well as federal emergency responders.
These types of discussions will continue, Boland says, with agencies determining
where to strike the balance between openness and security. She suspects that
more areas of geoscience will start to see the effects, with geologic hazards
entering the discussion on sensitive data.
Thinking as a terrorist would for devising possible uses of such hazards data,
she says: Lets say that I-70, where it runs through Colorado, has
several areas particularly vulnerable to rock falls, landslides or avalanches.
If you are a terrorist and you want to block I-70, setting off a small detonation
in those vulnerable areas could easily create a rock fall that would block the
road a plot line representative of the tough choices facing scientific
agencies.
Lisa M. Pinsker
Geotimes Home | AGI Home | Information Services | Geoscience Education | Public Policy | Programs | Publications | Careers |