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After the airline hijack attacks
of Sept. 11, America’s drinking water utilities jolted into high alert. State
police blocked public access roads to dams and reservoirs across the country.
Normally such protection is reserved for times of severe drought, when the risk
of fire threatens such facilities and public safety. But the terrorism assaults
have made protecting water supplies a matter of national security.
“We have to consider whether chemical plants, dams and water supply systems
can be turned into weapons through destruction or contamination,” says U.S.
Rep. John Duncan (R-Tenn.). Duncan chaired a hearing on the potential terrorism
threats to the nation’s water infrastructure on Oct. 10. “Government agencies
and the private sector must review the security of all of the critical infrastructure
they operate and where appropriate take steps to increase that security.”
As of early November, Congress had requests in the billions of dollars for water
security research efforts and improvements nationwide.
Scientists and political strategists agree such measures can reduce the vulnerability
of the nation’s water supply. “Even though it is difficult to intentionally
contaminate a water supply, it has happened in the past,” says hydrologist Glenn
Patterson of the U.S. Geological Survey. “Water supplies were targeted as an
act of war during the Civil War, in World War II and in Kosovo in 1998. It is
infrequent and unlikely, but it is conceivable.” Just how nervous is Patterson
about the threats to drinking water during the “War on Terrorism”? “I’m confident
enough in our water systems to drink the water from the tap. But I’m cautious
enough to think that increasing vigilance and improving security would be prudent
and worthwhile,” he says.
Today, 168,000 public drinking water systems serve America its tap water. And
despite the disparity in the quality of the water coming into the systems, be
it groundwater or surface water, national standards dictate what is allowed
out. Two years ago most managers listed oil and petroleum spills, agricultural
runoff and bacteria from untreated sewage discharges as the most significant
threats to drinking water. In 1998, President Clinton established a directive
to protect critical infrastructures, including water systems, from intentional
sabotage.
But in terms of bioterrorism attacks on water, the threat is limited. “With
regard to contamination by biological agents, the nation’s water supply may
seem to be a logical target for a terrorist attack,” testified Ronald Dick,
director of the FBI’s National Infrastructure Protection Center, at the hearing.
“In reality, targeting the water supply may prove difficult.”
In separate interviews, infectious disease experts and hydrologists agree that
attempts to contaminate major surface water systems before they are treated
would require an inordinate amount of toxins to combat the dilution factor.
“I don’t worry about someone having a biological agent and pouring it into a
reservoir before the water is treated,” says David Franz, Vice President of
the Chemical and Biological Defense Division of Southern Research Institute
in Frederick, Md.
Ronald Atlas, president-elect of the American Society for Microbiology, expresses
a similar opinion. “Take cyanide for instance. You would need an awful lot for
it not to be diluted out. And, as for bacteria, we assume there is an
influx of pathogens coming in already,” he says. “We treat for that by
adding chlorine, filtering the water and testing for bacteria and chemicals.”
Still, “you wouldn’t want to see a truck load of pesticides or nerve agents
fall off the American Legion Bridge into the Potomac River. That would be dangerous,”
Patterson says. “But, even then, the police would know about it before the contaminant
reached Washington, D.C., and could shut off the water supply.”
After Sept. 11, guards blocked public access to many reservoirs, dams and bridges.
The Quabbin Reservoir in Belchertown, Mass., has 181 miles of shoreline and
holds 412 billion gallons of water. Indeed, its size was a determining factor
for regulating public access, by simply making it easier to patrol during the
heightened alerts. “The Quabbin is so large that any attempts to damage its
integrity would be highly unlikely to succeed,” says David Gilmartin, spokesman
for the Massachusetts Water Resources Agency. “Water takes years to circulate
from one side to the other.”
In planning emergency response guidelines, each system must assess its own vulnerability
to attack, based on reservoir size, location, access and other security measures.
As back up, utilities often have multiple water supplies, such as groundwater.
Physical attack on infrastructure may be easier in terms of access to weapons
than biological or chemical attempts to sabotage a system. Fortunately the risk
behind terrorism threats can be minimized, says Mike Parker, spokesman for the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
The Corps operates 230 locks and dams, 383 major lakes and reservoirs, and one
drinking water treatment plant, which supplies water to Washington, D.C. Since
Sept. 11, temporary protection measures include “restricted public access, increased
standoff distances to critical structures, increased patrol activities, contracted
additional guard support, increased coordination with local law enforcement
and establishment of early warning telephone procedures,” Parker says.
Engineers stressed the importance of monitoring for sabotage attempts throughout
the water treatment process and especially where the water supply may be more
vulnerable, such as after treatment and at distribution facilities. Jeffrey
Danneels of Sandia National Laboratories is working with the Environmental Protection
Agency and the American Water Works Association Research Foundation to train
water utilities on how to identify their vulnerabilities, reduce their risk
of attack and mitigate consequences. Sandia has also invested over $11 million
in research efforts with the Department of Energy’s Chemical/Biological Non-proliferation
Program to design and prototype handheld chemistry laboratories to identify
biowarfare agents.
The cost of security can be high. “A low security level might mean hiring a
security guard and installing some detection features around critical assets,
and that won’t cost a lot,” Danneels says. “But to stop a fairly organized group
from committing a terrorist act could be extremely expensive.”
John Sullivan, president of the Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies,
which provides drinking water to 160 million people across the country, asked
Congress during the Oct. 10 hearing for $5 billion to help rehabilitate water
and waste-water treatment infrastructure. He requested $100 million to help
in assessing physical vulnerability for the nation’s largest water supply systems
and $55 million for enhancing and developing emergency response plans.
On Oct. 30, Sen. Jim Jeffords (I-Vt.) and Rep. Sherwood Boehlert (R-N.Y.) introduced
companion bills in the Senate and House respectively, a bill to authorize $12
million per year for the next six years to the EPA. With that money the
agency would grant research and development projects on efforts to prevent,
detect or respond to physical and cyber threats to water supply and wastewater
treatment systems.
Olympic planning
In Utah, security is a matter
of Olympic concerns. Estimated costs of preparation, monitoring and vulnerability
tests for Salt Lake Valley alone stretch easily into the millions. Preparations
aimed specifically at protecting drinking water systems during the Olympics
have cost millions, says Kim Dyches, emergency response coordinator for the
Utah Division of Drinking Water. Some of the costs include toximeters with live
organisms to monitor the toxicity of the water before it is treated — $43,000
each. Helicopter surveillance costs $600 a trip. “Some of the other costs are
from hiring security guards, and outside firms to do vulnerability assessments,
training, increased surveillance, camera coverage, employee wages, increased
sampling and monitoring and the list goes on,” Dyches says. But those costs
were already planned before the events on Sept. 11. “We realized Utah could
be a target right from the time the Olympics were announced in 1996.”
Dyches adds that with 70,000 to 100,000 additional people at the Olympics the
city will need an additional 5.5 million gallons of water per day. “The water
demand during that time of year is low and a lot of visitors will be drinking
bottled water. So we don’t anticipate any problems with delivering the additional
increase during that time.”
Bart Forsyth, assistant general manager of water supply/water quality for Jordan
Valley Water Conservancy District in Utah, says they originally budgeted $200,000
for security during the Olympics, but “as a result of the events on Sept. 11,
we’ve increased our security budget substantially. It’s now close to half a
million.” Jordan Valley supplies about 70 million gallons of drinking water
to more than 600,000 people in Salt Lake County. “We’ve had to reprioritize
our water system improvement projects, deferring lower priority projects in
order to pay for security improvements this year, “ Forsyth says. Some of the
security measures they have added include cameras, lighting, water quality detection
systems, fencing and replacement of concrete barriers. “When we first found
out about the Olympics, obviously we were concerned about security. The events
on Sept. 11 raised the need for security much higher than any of us had ever
dreamed, far more than we had envisioned or anticipated early on. We live in
a new world, and I don’t expect it will ever change back. Everything we do now
for the Olympics and the money we are spending on security improvements will
remain in place after the Olympics are over.”
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