The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has been under fire since it
failed to adequately prepare for and effectively respond to Hurricane Katrina,
which struck the Louisiana coast on Aug. 29, 2005, as a Category-3 storm. This
is not the first time that FEMA has come up short in the face of a strong hurricane.
Their preparations and response are similar to problems the agency experienced
when Hurricane Andrew struck the Florida coast as a Category-4 storm on Aug.
24, 1992. Created to make federal disaster response more effective, the recently
restructured FEMA remains hampered by management, authority and communication
issues.
State governors called for the creation of FEMA after a string of disastrous
hurricanes (Carla, 1962; Betsy, 1965; Camille, 1969; and Agnes, 1972) and two
major earthquakes (Alaska, 1964; and San Fernando, 1971). State officials had
difficulties responding to these events, while dealing with a plethora of disparate
federal agencies, so they pressed President Jimmy Carter to create a centralized
federal agency that would be more effective and more responsive to state needs.
Carter’s executive order in 1979 created FEMA and merged many smaller agencies.
The order transferred the authority vested in the president for emergency response
to the director of FEMA, including duties described in the Federal Civil Defense
Act of 1950, the two disaster relief acts of 1970 and 1974, and the Earthquake
Hazard Reduction Act of 1977.
In 1988, the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
replaced several previous relief acts, to spell out how much federal aid a state
or local community could receive, essentially increasing the federal commitment
to communities. The act also tried to simplify and clarify the statutory authority
of FEMA. Under the act, once a governor has made a specific request, the president
has the authority to provide federal aid and direction for all federal resources.
Once the president has declared a disaster, a federal coordinating officer (FCO)
assigned by the director of FEMA coordinates the federal response. The president
can give the FCO authority to coordinate all relief activities if the local
community is overwhelmed. Also at the request of the governor, the president
may utilize military resources, which are generally directed toward the stated
needs of the governor.
The system, however, broke down with Hurricane Katrina, partly because of confusion
about who had authority, a lack of pre-planning before the storm, a hesitancy
of the military to get involved and a lack of communication within devastated
communities. Critics have also blamed FEMA’s reorganization within the
Department of Homeland Security as another reason for its troubled response
to this storm. Again, history can provide some perspective on what may have
gone wrong.
When Hurricane Andrew struck Florida and the Gulf Coast in 1992, FEMA was an
independent agency. Like Katrina, Andrew had the potential to devastate a major
city, Miami, but veered just south. Early assessments suggested that there was
less damage than expected. Later reports from southern Dade County, however,
were shocking, and it soon became clear that FEMA was unprepared to handle that
level of devastation. Food, water, shelter, security and electricity did not
arrive for days, and chaos and frustration erupted in many areas. In the end,
Andrew caused 23 deaths and about $30 billion in property damage, and left 250,000
people homeless.
President Bill Clinton took office soon after Hurricane Andrew and elevated
FEMA to a cabinet-level agency. He appointed James Lee Witt, a former state
emergency manager, as director (which was the first time FEMA had a leader with
emergency management experience), and had Witt report directly to him. Witt
proceeded to streamline operations, emphasize preparation and require effective
customer service.
The September 11 terrorist attacks refocused attention on disaster response,
and President George W. Bush created the Department of Homeland Security in
March 2003, consolidating 22 federal agencies into one massive administration.
FEMA became an office in the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate
and began to focus primarily on terrorism. In June 2005, Michael Brown, who
was appointed director of FEMA in January 2003, decried the de-emphasis on natural
hazards and the reduction of resources for FEMA in a letter to Michael Jackson,
the second-in-command at Homeland Security. Hurricane Katrina struck two months
later, causing more than 1,300 deaths and more than $100 billion in property
damage, and displacing as many as 1 million people.
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff,
based on a study completed before the storm, directed that FEMA no longer be
responsible for preparedness and not have a director appointed by the president.
Instead, a new Undersecretary of Preparedness (George Foresman, Virginia’s
Emergency Manager) will lead a new Directorate of Preparedness. Preparedness
and Response will be separate directorates that oversee multiple smaller agencies
with overlapping responsibilities.
Thus, Homeland Security has returned to an organizational structure that is
similar to the structure that did not work in the 1960s and 1970s. Such an organizational
structure may create greater management and leadership problems because it is
possible that one agency may assume the other agency is handling some critical
preparation task, leaving no one responsible for the needs. States and disaster
experts have repeatedly noted that effective response often depends on coordinated
preparation, as was the case with the Coast Guard during Hurricane Katrina —
a prime example of good preparation coordinated with relief efforts.
FEMA has long been working on three major disaster scenarios: a hurricane hitting
New Orleans, a major earthquake occurring in San Francisco and a terrorist act
affecting New York City. Such planning shows that the federal government has
been giving serious consideration to some good plans for several major and very
probable disasters. Through such efforts, the government can move forward, to
effectively use science and technology in preparation for different risk scenarios
and to more effectively respond to the next major disaster.
With the threat of terrorism still high, more hurricanes expected in the near
future, continued flooding from hurricanes and other storms, unpredictable earthquakes,
and significant population growth in high-risk regions, federal disaster preparedness
and response have never been more important. Future mismanagement could cost
the nation unnecessary loss of life and excessive economic losses.
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